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Introduction
Despite having been voluntarily withdrawn 
from the market almost 10 years ago, the non-ste-
roidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) rofecoxib 
(Vioxx®, Merck & Co.) remains an infamous and 
controversial drug in the minds of the public and 
physicians alike. While it is no longer making its 
way into prescription bottles, its legacy lives on, 
in its enduring influences, on drug safety monito-
ring in the conduct of randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs) and on modern practices in drug marketing 
and development.
The Vioxx® story
Rofecoxib was developed by Merck & Co. as 
a cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) selective NSAID. 
The premise behind its pharmacology was simple: 
it would selectively block the inducible COX-2 
iso-enzyme that was important in pain and inflam-
mation without affecting the constitutive COX-1 
iso-enzyme that maintains gastrointestinal (GI) 
mucosa integrity and mediates platelet function. 
This selectivity would make it the preferred choice 
over non-selective NSAIDs such as naproxen and 
ibuprofen, offering pain control with a reduced risk 
of adverse effects on GI and platelet function.
The United States Federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved rofecoxib for the 
treatment of osteoarthritis in early 1999. The 
approval was based on its efficacy and safety in pha-
se II and III RCTs. Thereafter, Merck & Co. began 
an ambitious marketing campaign for the drug, in-
cluding various mass media advertisements aimed 
at active middle-aged patients. The advertisement 
efforts included soliciting the endorsement of cele-
brities such as Olympic gold medal-winning figure 
skater Dorothy Hamill to promote the product. The 
campaign was a great success; over 100 million 
rofecoxib prescriptions were written in the United 
States in its first 12 months on the market.
Just as rofecoxib was escalating in popularity 
as a prescription NSAID, the clinical trial that 
would result in its ultimate demise was coming to 
a conclusion. Published in 2000, The VIGOR trial 
compared GI side effects in rheumatoid arthritis 
patients taking rofecoxib vs. naproxen [1]. The 
8,076 patient, multi-center, randomized, double 
blind study found a statistically significant relative 
risk reduction of 50% for GI events in the patients 
on rofecoxib; it was a success for Merck & Co. and 
their marketing efforts for the drug. Unfortunately, 
the study also revealed an unexpected increase 
in the risk of cardiovascular (CV) events. In an 
interim analysis of the data, it was apparent that 
patients randomized to rofecoxib had more CV 
events. The authors postulated that this differen-
ce was due to an “acetylsalicylic acid (ASA)-like 
anti-platelet effect” of naproxen. In the published 
version of the trial, 0.4% (n = 17) of the patients 
on rofecoxib were reported as having suffered 
myocardial infarctions (MI’s) compared to only 
0.1% (n = 4) of those on naproxen. Ultimately, 
the authors attributed this difference to the fact 
that a small group of study subjects who met 
criteria for ASA for secondary CV prophylaxis 
but were not receiving ASA (4%) accounted for 
a disproportionate percentage (38%) of the MI’s. It 
would, however, later come to light that Merck & 
Co. knew about, but did not report, all of the MI’s 
that occurred among the rofecoxib patients. The 
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study had a GI event reporting cutoff date of March 
2000, however CV events were only reported up to 
February 2000. An additional three MI’s occurred 
in the final month of the study and were known to 
the steering committee at the time of final sub-
mission, but were not reported in the published 
manuscript [2]. This apparent concealment of 
adverse events would become more widely known 
a few years later after the results of the APPROVe 
trial became known. This placebo-controlled trial 
evaluated secondary chemoprevention of colorectal 
cancer with rofecoxib and included pre-specified 
CV secondary endpoints, finding a relative risk of 
1.92 (95% CI 1.19–3.11, p = 0.008) for CV events in 
patients taking rofecoxib compared to placebo [3]. 
After learning these data, Merck & Co. voluntarily 
withdrew Vioxx® from the market, citing it was the 
most reasonable course of action [4]. However, 
lawsuits and subsequent investigations uncovered 
the knowledge of the three “hidden MI’s” and furt-
her drove speculation and proceedings around this 
drug both in the academic and public fora.
Aftermath
Numerous opinions and analyses were pub-
lished following the withdrawal of rofecoxib. 
A 2005 editorial re-analyzed the VIGOR CV safety 
outcomes with omission and inclusion of the “three 
hidden MIs” — finding an increase in the relati-
ve risk of having an MI on rofecoxib to 5.0 (95% 
CI 1.68–20.13) [2]. With respect to the authors’ 
initial speculation that naproxen may have had an 
ASA-like antiplatelet effect in the VIGOR trial, 
serious doubt is cast on this hypothesis when 
the relative risk of the thrombotic events among 
patients on naproxen in the VIGOR trial (RR 0.42, 
95% CI 0.25–0.072) is compared against the anti-
platelet benefit from the antithrombotic trialist’s 
collaboration (RR 0.78, 95% CI 0.74–0.82). Even 
controlling for differences in study procedures and 
patient populations, it was hard to defend a nearly 
2-fold difference in the relative risk [5].
Running in parallel with the academic analyses 
were mass media and legal campaigns — images 
of which still endure in the public’s consciousness. 
Vioxx® was the subject of billboards, television, 
internet and magazine advertisements and talk 
shows. It is estimated that up to 88,000 patients 
in the United States alone had an MI while ta-
king Vioxx®. There were some 13,000 lawsuits 
by 47,000 plaintiffs and Merck & Co. established 
a US$ 4.85 billion fund to settle the lawsuits [6]. 
In 2011, Merck & Co. would be levied a $US 
950 million penalty for illegal marketing [7]. The 
investor lawsuits remain unsettled to date.
The influence of the Vioxx® legacy is endu-
ring today and encompasses 3 principal themes: 
changes in the field of pharmacovigilance, a better 
understanding of COX biology and its role in inflam-
mation and, finally, drug development, reporting 
and marketing in the determination of drug safety.
In the aftermath of the Vioxx® story and that of 
other contemporary and controversial drugs such 
as prucalopride (Resolor®, Johnson & Johnson), 
there were wide-sweeping changes in the practice 
of pharmacovigilance [8]. Pharmacovigilance is 
defined as a set of practices aimed at the detection, 
understanding and assessment of risks related to 
the use of drugs in a population and the prevention 
of consequential adverse effects [9]. Regulating 
bodies such as the United States FDA now impose 
tighter regulations on how safety data is to be col-
lected and reported. Whereas a large part of drug 
development was often focused on efficacy, these 
changes now give the reporting of safety a more 
important role both in the pre- and post-marketing 
phases of drug development.
Based on the Vioxx® case, we have a better 
understanding of COX biology and inflammation. 
The premise behind the pharmacology of selective 
COX-2 inhibition was that if it could selectively block 
the inducible iso-enzyme that stimulated pain and 
inflammation, it would allow the constitutive COX-1 
iso-enzyme to maintain GI mucosal integrity and 
mediate platelet function. Unfortunately, the result 
was an increase in thrombotic risk. We now know 
that selective COX-2 inhibition decreases vascular 
prostacyclin and may affect the balance between 
prothrombotic and antithrombotic eicosanoids. 
Unlike the platelet inhibition afforded by COX-1 
inhibitors, COX-2 inhibitors do not share this an-
tithrombotic property. In contrast, by decreasing 
vasodilatory and antiaggregatory prostaglandin 
production, COX-2 antagonists appear to tip the 
balance in favor of the prothrombotic molecules that 
may lead to increased CV thrombotic events [5, 10].
The third theme within the Vioxx® legacy is 
still evolving. The research and development of 
rofecoxib, like many prescription drugs on the 
market today, was funded in large part by the in-
vestment of private capital. The financial fallout 
of Vioxx® and its subsequent scandal are not yet 
completely settled. As a result of the Vioxx® le-
gacy, companies and investors alike will, without 
any doubt, take lessons from the final legal and 
financial consequences in designing future invest-
ment strategies.
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Conclusions
While the developers of rofecoxib hoped it 
would be a “magic bullet” for pain relief, ultimately 
it had an unexpected adverse effect and brought 
harm to many. Despite its adverse effects, Vioxx® 
did give symptomatic relief to millions of patients. 
Some still swear to this day that they would trade 
the improved quality of life afforded to them by 
rofecoxib for even a doubling in their own risk of 
a heart attack. While the numbers of people who 
had events were large, they are small as a propor-
tion of those who actually took the drug. One can 
only speculate, if Vioxx® had only been studied 
more carefully and marketed less ambitiously, 
might it have been possible to identify patients 
that would have benefited from the drug while 
preventing its use in those most at risk for a CV 
event? We will never know the answer to this 
question but the legacy of Vioxx® lives on and 
continues to affect us today. One can only hope 
that drug manufacturers, regulators, clinicians and 
the public are able to take lessons from Vioxx® to 
more responsibly bring products to market in an 
ethical and transparent way.
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